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HOW HEALTH CARE ATTORNEYS CAN DISCERN VERNON, 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND SETTLEMENT ISSUES 
GREG RADINSKY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, two notable trends have emerged in health care: (1) 
the United States government has made it a priority to minimize fraud, waste, 
and abuse in the federal health care programs;1 and (2) health care entities have 
consolidated and merged.2  As these two trends continue to grow, several 
mergers and consolidations will involve health care providers that are either 
under investigation or have resolved their overpayment and/or False Claims 
Act liability.3  As a result, an increasing number of health care attorneys will 
be asked to assess their clients’ Medicare liability before those clients enter 
into a corporate transaction to buy a health care provider that owes the 
government Medicare overpayments, civil fines, or penalties. 
Part II of this article provides a summary of why these emerging trends 
will continue to flourish.  Part III summarizes the pertinent successor liability 
law affecting the structuring of corporate transactions.  Proceeding from that 
 
* Mr. Radinsky received his B.A., magna cum laude, from Tufts University and his J.D., magna 
cum laude, from St. Louis University School of Law. He is currently an Associate Counsel in the 
Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Washington, D.C.  He is responsible for coordinating Global Settlements, False Claims Act 
litigation and settlements, and qui tam litigation.  In addition, Mr. Radinsky works on legal 
matters that pertain to the Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (“PATH”) initiative, home health 
agencies, and skilled nursing facilities.  The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the Inspector General, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, or the United States Government. 
 1. See United States Attorney General Janet Reno, Address to the American Hospital Ass’n 
[hereinafter Reno Address] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/1998/0202 
_ag_aha.htm> (transcript of Attorney General Janet Reno’s Feb. 2, 1998 speech on the 
government’s fight against health care fraud); infra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Alice G. Gosfield, The New Playing Field, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 869, 875 (1997); 
infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Robert J. Pristave & Elizabeth Birt, White Coats, Dark Deeds: Accountability v. 
Fraud, 6 BUS. L. TODAY 24 (1997) (reporting that many large health care providers are being 
investigated by the government). 
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discussion, Part IV provides an analysis of how courts and the government will 
likely view Medicare successor liability issues in the future.4 
II. EMERGING AND CONTINUING TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE 
A.  The Government’s Effort to Curtail Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
The federal government is unlikely to decrease its fervent enforcement 
efforts to reduce the proliferation of health care fraud and abuse.5  First, 
Attorney General Janet Reno has placed health care fraud alongside violent 
crime as a top enforcement priority of the Clinton Administration.6  The 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and United States Attorney’s Offices 
throughout the country are working closely with the Office of Inspector 
General for the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(“OIG”) and other federal and state law enforcement agencies to pursue 
criminal and civil remedies in health care fraud matters.7  In fiscal year 1999, 
483 qui tam cases were filed and over $458 million was returned to the United 
States Treasury.8  At the very least, health care fraud enforcement will remain 
a top priority during the second term of the Clinton administration.9 
 
 4. Medicare is a federal health care program created by the Social Security Amendments of 
1965.  Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).  There are similarities between the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, which make much of the discussion in this article applicable to Medicaid.  
However, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Medicaid program. 
 5. See generally Reno Address, supra note 1. 
 6. Kim H. Roeder & Sara Kay Sledge, Concentrated Government Efforts to Prosecute 
Fraud, and Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, Make Compliance Programs Necessary For Health 
Care Organizations, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at B5. 
 7. James G. Sheehan, The Office of Inspector General: Health Care Financing 
Administration Projects, in HEALTH CARE M & A 1998, at 747, 902 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7234, 1998).  See also Kip Betz, Special Report: FBI Using 
More Funding, Staffing to Proactively Fight Fraud Schemes, 3 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 
522 (June 16, 1999). 
 8. Taxpayers Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics (last modified Nov. 1999) 
<http:\www.taf.org/taf/docs/qtstats99.html>.  In fiscal year 1997, a record 534 qui tam cases were 
filed and over $625 million was recovered by the DOJ.  Id. 
 9. See id.  See also Stuart M. Gerson, Will New Federal Guidelines Arrest Overzealous Use 
of False Claims Act?, 13 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 3 (1999).  The False Claims Act is the 
subject of debate in the health care provider community because the industry believes the 
government is overreaching in its health care enforcement efforts.  Id.  In response to a growing 
demand for reform of the False Claims Act and lobbying pressure from the provider community 
regarding the government’s treatment of health care providers in recent national initiatives, the 
Department of Justice and OIG separately issued national guidelines to ensure that health care 
providers are treated in a fair and even-handed manner.  See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., Deputy Attorney General, “Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care 
Matters” (June 3, 1998); Memorandum from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General, “National 
Project Protocols-Best Practice Guidelines” (June 3, 1998) (on file with author).  See also 
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Second, the government continues to report on astonishing losses by the 
federal health care programs.10  For example, an OIG audit of fiscal year 1998 
estimated improper payments for Medicare fee-for-service benefits totaled 
$12.6 billion.11  Although the OIG’s fraud and abuse initiatives had a 
significant impact in reducing improper payments by the federal health care 
programs,12 and the 1998 audit was $7.7 billion less than the fiscal year 1997 
estimate of $20.3 billion, the OIG still believes $12.6 billion to be an 
unacceptable loss to the government and stresses that continued enforcement 
efforts are needed.13 
Third, Congress enacted extensive legislation specifically to eliminate 
fraud, waste, and abuse in health care.14  The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) was enacted to bolster health care 
fraud and abuse prevention and enforcement.15  HIPAA increased the potential 
liability for false claims by revising the administrative penalties for false 
claims.16  HIPAA also increased the civil monetary penalties from $2,000 to 
$10,000 per false claim, and raised the amount of authorized assessments from 
double to triple the amount claimed.17  HIPAA additionally provided 
significant improvements in health care fraud enforcement including a stable 
source of funding for health care fraud efforts, additional OIG agents, FBI 
agents and prosecutors, and private sector alternatives to detect health care 
fraud.18 
 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-98-195, MEDICARE: APPLICATION OF THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO HOSPITAL BILLING PRACTICES (1998) (discussing the guideline’s effects 
on the provider community’s impression of health care enforcement by the government). 
 10. FY 1998 Financial Statement Audit Health Care Financing Administration (HFCA): 
Hearing Before Subcomm. On Gov’t Management, Information and Technology of the House 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 104th Cong. 3 (1999) [hereinafter FY 1998 Financial Statement Audit] 
(statement of Inspector General June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General).  See also HHS IG 
Estimates Medicare Overpaid $22 Million for Improper PPS Readmissions, 3 Health Care Fraud 
Rep. (BNA) 421 (May 19, 1999); IG Reports Savings of $6.8 Billion in Most Recent Semiannual 
Report, 3 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 498 (June 16, 1999). 
 11. FY 1998 Financial Statement Audit, supra note 10, at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 3, 7. 
 14. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA]; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 15. See HIPAA, 110 Stat. at 1936. 
 16. HIPAA § 212, 110 Stat. at 2004. 
 17. HIPAA § 215(a), 110 Stat. at 2006.  For a summary of the Civil Monetary Penalties 
Law, see Lewis Morris, Role of OIG/OLC CMPL, Exclusions, Global Settlements, in CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE SUPP. 1996, at 81, 83-84 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 
B7-6958, 1996). 
 18. HIPAA required the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Department of Justice to establish a fraud and abuse control program to achieve several goals: (1) 
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Congress added more health care law enforcement authorities by enacting 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (“BBA”).19  BBA provided the authority to 
expand regulations “to fight waste, fraud, and abuse in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs.”20  BBA includes several of the President’s proposed anti-
fraud and abuse initiatives, including the issuance of Stark Law21 advisory 
opinions, exclusion of convicted felons from the federal health care programs, 
and new civil monetary penalties for anti-kickback law violations.22   
The government plans on the continued use of the recently enacted health 
care fraud legislation.23  For example, the OIG plans to finalize regulations that 
will implement a new and revised civil monetary penalty authority delegated to 
the OIG and promulgate regulations for implementing the civil monetary 
penalty authority applicable to Medicare+Choice organizations.24  With such 
additional resources and tools, the government can continue its diligent pursuit 
of health care fraud violations.25 
Finally, the number of qui tam26 suits filed under the False Claims Act27 
has increased exponentially.28  Health care fraud accounts for the majority of 
 
coordinate federal, state and local law enforcement programs to control fraud and abuse with 
respect to health plans; (2) conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, and inspections relating to 
the delivery of and payment for health care in the United States; (3) facilitate the enforcement of 
the civil, criminal and administrative statutes applicable to health care; (4) provide industry 
guidance, including advisory opinions, safe harbors, and special fraud alerts relating to fraudulent 
health care practices; and (5) establish a national data bank to receive and report final adverse 
actions against health care providers.  See HIPAA § 201(a), 110 Stat. at 1992 (establishing a 
fraud and abuse control program). 
 19. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 20. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 111 Stat. at 319. 
 21. The Federal Self-Referral Statute (“the Stark Law”) prohibits physicians from referring 
certain “designated health services” to entities in which the physician or a member of his/her 
family has an ownership or compensation interest, and also prohibits the entity from presenting a 
Medicare claim for the services.  42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  For a discussion 
of the Stark Law, see Greg Radinsky, Defining a Group Practice: An Analysis of the Stark I Final 
Rule, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119 (1997); Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, The Stark Laws: Conquering 
Physician Conflicts of Interest?, 87 GEO. L.J. 499 (1998). 
 22. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 111 Stat. at 271. 
 23. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
WORK PLAN: HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION PROJECTS, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 44 
(1999);  see also IG Red Book Outlines Cost-Saving Recommendations for Medicare, Medicaid, 3 
Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 422 (May 19, 1999). 
 24. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, supra note 23, at 44.  See also HHS IG 
Planning Final Rules on Safe Harbors, HIPAA Civil Penalties, 2 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 
870 (Nov. 18, 1998); HHS IG, AOA Develop Performance Measures to Monitor Fraud-Fighting 
Grants, 2 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 321 (May 6, 1998). 
 25. See Regulatory Agenda Sets Goals for HHS IG Rules in Next Six Months, 3 Health Care 
Fraud Rep. (BNA) 388 (May 5, 1999). 
 26. A qui tam suit is filed by a person (“relator”) on behalf of the government to recover 
damages and penalties under the False Claims Act.  31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(1) (1994).  Depending 
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the new qui tam cases.29  The percentage of qui tam cases involving HHS as 
the client agency has increased from twelve percent to sixty-one percent over 
the past twelve years.30  The False Claims Act stipulates that the government 
must review each qui tam suit filed and decide whether it is worthwhile to 
pursue.31  As a result, the government will continue to be kept busy as more 
qui tam suits are filed each year.  For the foregoing reasons, health care 
providers will continue to be challenged by government enforcement initiatives 
to deter fraud and abuse. 
B. Consolidation and Merger of Health Care-Entities 
Consolidation and mergers are rampant in the health care industry today.32  
These corporate acquisitions are taking multiple forms, including mergers of 
health insurance companies and health maintenance organizations, health care 
 
on whether the government decides to intervene, the relator can recover between fifteen and thirty 
percent of the proceeds plus reasonable expenses and attorney fees.  Id. § 3730 (d)(1).  See also 
DOJ Relator’s Share Guidelines, 11 TAF Q. REV. 17 (1997) (discussing how Department of 
Justice determines the percentage of the relator’s share). 
 27. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).  Congress enacted the civil False Claims Act, also known as 
the “Lincoln Law,” to deter and detect “rampant fraud” in federal defense contracting during the 
Civil War.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5285-86 
(explaining the history of the False Claims Act).  The False Claims Act was significantly 
amended in 1986 to combat all forms of government procurement and contracting fraud, 
including fraud with respect to the federal health care programs.  See generally S. REP. NO. 99-
345. 
 28. Taxpayers Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics (last modified Nov. 1999) 
<http:\www.taf.org/taf/docs/qtstats99.html>.  In November 1999, the Department of Justice 
reported that total qui tam recoveries amounted to approximately $2.9 billion after the False 
Claims Act was amended in 1986.  Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994).  This section states that qui tam actions may be dismissed 
“only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons 
for consenting.”  Id.  The False Claims Act provides the government at least sixty days to review 
each case.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1994).  However, because the government routinely seeks 
extensions for review, seals on qui tam cases are frequently extended for several months or even a 
year or more.  See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 4-101 to 4-104 
(1993 & Supp. 1999). 
 32. Trends in the Profession, 62 TEX. B.J. 19 (1999).  See also Russell C. Coile, Jr., [A] 
Healthcare 2001: Transitions, Transactions and Transformations [B] Healthcare Forecast [C] 
Healthcare Trends: Jan. 1997, 1998, in HEALTH CARE M & A 1998, at 323, 361 (PLI Corp. Law 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7234, 1998).  The federal government treats a merger 
and a consolidation as a separate and distinct transaction.  The Health Care Financing 
Administration  (“HCFA”) regulations define merger as “a combination of two or more 
corporations under the corporation laws of the State, with one of the corporations surviving” and 
consolidation as “the combination of two or more corporations resulting in the creation of a new 
corporate entity.”  42 C.F.R. § 413.134(k)(2)-(3) (1998). 
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systems acquiring hospitals, and physician management companies acquiring 
physician practices.33  There are two primary events that explain why the 
consolidation and merger of health care providers are likely to continue to 
occur in the future. 
First, the movement toward managed care has prompted many health care 
providers to consolidate or merge.34  In today’s economic climate, the health 
care industry is focused on delivering health care services in the most efficient 
and cost-effective manner.35  The government and the health care industry 
regard managed care organizations, which often use capitation,36 as an 
effective method of controlling the costs of medical care.37 
Consolidation has been essential for managed care companies: (1) to 
provide national coverage; (2) to enhance their product line; (3) to achieve 
economies of scale; and (4) to augment their bargaining leverage in negotiating 
capitation arrangements.38  Tenet Healthcare Corporation, one of the largest 
hospital chains, recognizes this trend and has made acquiring more of the 
growing managed care market a top priority.39  It is likely that the managed 
care market will continue to grow and estimates suggest that eighty percent of 
Americans will receive health care from some form of managed care by the 
year 2000.40  As a result, health care corporations must consolidate to continue 
competing effectively in the managed care marketplace.41 
Second, the continued implementation of the prospective payment system 
(“PPS”) to reimburse health care providers for services and supplies rendered 
to Medicare beneficiaries will compel health care providers to consolidate.  In 
1983, the Medicare program implemented its PPS for most inpatient hospital 
stays to award efficient hospitals for cost-effective delivery of health care 
 
 33. Coile, supra note 32, at 361. 
 34. See Trends in the Profession, supra note 32, at 19-20. 
 35. See Nancy A. Peterman, Protecting Patients’ Rights in Health Care Bankruptcies, 17 
AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 10 (1998); James T. Markus & John F. Young, Anti-Discrimination 
Provisions- Do They Have Any Real Meaning?, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 14 (1998). 
 36. Capitation is a method of payment whereby the health care provider is paid a fixed 
amount on behalf of a group or individual to provide a specified set of health care services.  
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Healthcare Marketplace: Life 
in the Healthcare Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 210-13 (1996). 
 37. Id.  See also Patrick O’Neill, Doctor Fee Plan May Cure High Costs, But Opponents 
Decry Side Effects, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 25, 1996, at A1 (stating “capitation has won 
widespread favor in the health care industry and in government as a way to control runaway 
medical costs”). 
 38. Paul T. Schnell & Teresa M. Andresen, Managing Managed Care Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 2 M & A LAW., Sept. 1998, at 1. 
 39. See TENET HEALTH CARE CORP., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1999). 
 40. Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to 
the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1997). 
 41. See Aetna to Acquire Prudential Healthcare, Become Largest Health Care Provider in 
U.S., MEALEY’S INS. L. WKLY., Dec. 14, 1998, at 4. 
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services.42  PPS limits the amount of reimbursement to those hospitals by 
predetermining a fixed price for a particular diagnostic related group.43  This 
payment system accounts for a substantial portion of hospital revenue and has 
an overall effect of making hospitals more cost-efficient because actual 
reimbursements are based upon a fixed rate rather than the actual cost of each 
provided service.44 
This change in the payment system resulted in reduced reimbursement 
levels for many hospitals.45  As a result, several hospitals chose to consolidate 
to reduce operating costs and increase profits by operating on a larger scale.46  
This trend is likely to continue as more types of health care providers, such as 
skilled nursing facilities, are reimbursed under the new Medicare PPS that took 
effect January 1, 1999.47  It is uncertain whether these health care providers 
will be able to remain solvent under the new Medicare reimbursement 
system.48  PPS has had a far greater impact than any financial analyst or 
policymaker expected.49  For example, Vencor Inc. and Sun Healthcare Group, 
two of the nation’s largest nursing homes chains, are in dire financial straits.50  
Many other health care companies are experiencing similar problems and have 
 
 42. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 13-10, at 574-75 (1995). 
 43. Id. § 13-10, at 574 
 44. Id. at 575. 
 45. See Stephen H. Siegel, Consolidation of Physicians and Other Noninstitutional 
Providers, 72 FLA. B.J. 18 (1998).  See also John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical 
Profession: Old Issues and Old Tensions: The Building Blocks of Tomorrow’s Health Care 
Delivery and Financing System, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 45-49 (1996-1997); Rob Daumeyer, Tight 
Market Forces Hospitals to Examine Consolidations, CIN. BUS. COURIER, Mar. 28, 1988, at 14. 
 46. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 18. 
 47. See, e.g., Ann Saphir, SNFS Face Prospect of Major Upheaval, MOD. HEALTHCARE, 
Jan. 4, 1999, at 32; Karen Pallarito, More Financial Pain: Market Gyrations Deal Another Blow 
to Healthcare Stocks, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 14, 1998, at 72.  Home health agencies are 
expected to reimbursed under the new Medicare PPS in the near future; however, these health 
care providers currently are being reimbursed under a transitional “interim payment system.”  Id. 
 48. See Saphir, supra note 47, at 72. See also Howard W. Dickstein, PPS Isn’t Working, 
NURSING HOMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 9. 
 49. See Outcry Grows Over Nursing Home PPS Losses, But Some Are Doing Fine, MED. & 
HEALTH, Apr. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10391841; Lyn Danninger, Fed Regulations 
Threaten Home Health Services, PAC. BUS. NEWS, Apr. 23, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 
8090148; Rachel Kamuf & Eric Benmour, Vencor’s Restructuring Options Vary, Analysts Say, 
BUS. FIRST-LOUISVILLE, Apr. 12, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 8382756. 
 50. Kamuf & Benmour, supra note 49.  Vencor Inc. and Sun Healthcare’s financial 
problems were not caused exclusively by the change in the federal health care programs’ 
reimbursement system.  Both these companies are highly leveraged companies as a result of rapid 
growth through acquisitions.  See Corporate Loan Ratings: Moody’s Assigns Four New Ratings—
Sun Healthcare, 21 BANK LETTER, July 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12156157; Vencor 
Wrestles with Leverage, Regulatory Changes 22 BANK LETTER, June 15, 1998, available in 1998 
WL 20367319; Investors Buy Up Bargains Caused by Shaky Market, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 
4, 1998, at 23. 
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either closed their businesses or are on the verge of filing for bankruptcy.51  As 
a result, many skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies may need to 
consolidate to survive or augment profits.  Consolidation would allow them to 
reduce their administrative costs while improving market leverage.52  Some of 
these distressed companies, including Vencor, are also under investigation by 
the federal government for possible fraudulent conduct.53  Accordingly, 
expanding health care corporations may decide to purchase these distressed 
companies through an “asset sale” to insulate themselves from the liabilities of 
the seller. 
As managed care and PPS continue to expand, consolidation in the health 
care industry will continue unless Congress passes legislation that changes the 
dynamics of the federal health care programs’ reimbursement system to allow 
smaller corporations and less financially secure corporations to remain in 
business.  Thus, the government is using great vigilance in investigating and 
prosecuting health care fraud violations.  At the same time, there is a growing 
trend for health care organizations to consolidate, merge and purchase each 
other’s assets.54  Therefore, it is important to address the liability of the new 
and surviving corporate entity. 
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY LAW 
A.  Successor Liability at Common Law 
Corporate health care transactions are usually structured as an asset 
purchase, rather than a stock purchase or a merger, to insulate the buyer from 
the seller’s liabilities.  When a corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its 
assets, the general common law rule indicates that the buyer does not assume 
 
 51. See Kamuf & Benmour, supra note 49. 
 52. Other factors resulting in the consolidation of smaller health care entities into larger 
regional and national operators are the increased complexity of medical services provided, 
growing regulatory and compliance requirements and the increasingly complicated 
reimbursement systems.  Smaller entities often lack the financial resources to efficiently and 
effectively deal with the various laws, governmental policies and economic forces that are 
changing the health care industry.  See, e.g., Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. SEC 10-K Form (visited 
Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/904978/0001047469-98-003752.txt>. 
 53. See Andy Miller, Stock of Atlanta-Based Nursing Home Operator Falls after Deal 
Canceled, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Apr. 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 14824638 
(stating that “Federal investigators, in a five-year campaign against health care fraud, are looking 
at possible Medicare billing problems at other long-term care companies, such as Beverly 
Enterprises and Vencor.”); Vickie Chachere, U.S. Attorney Investigating Vencor, TAMPA TRIB., 
Nov. 19, 1998, at 1. 
 54. For the convenience of reference, when the term “consolidate” is used, it is often used 
collectively to mean consolidate, merge and asset purchase. 
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the corporation’s liabilities.55  This general rule is based upon the premise that 
when one corporation sells its assets, it transfers an interest distinct from that 
of the corporate entity itself.56  However, this general rule is subject to the 
following four exceptions: (1) an expressed or implied assumption of 
liability;57 (2) a transaction that amounts to a de facto merger;58 (3) a mere 
continuation of the transferor corporation by the transferee;59 and (4) a 
transaction that was fraudulent.60 
Additionally, some courts will impose liability when dictated by matters of 
public policy, or where there has been an attempt to frustrate a federal statute.  
For example, in Upholsterers’ International Union Pension Fund v. Artistic 
Furniture of Pontiac, the Seventh Circuit exceeded the traditional exceptions 
 
 55. See, e.g., Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971); Bud 
Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985); Conn v. Fales Div. of 
Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145, 146 (6th Cir. 1987); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 
849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Under this exception, the successor corporation or buyer must have either expressly or 
impliedly assumed the liabilities pursuant to the contractual agreement that created the successor 
corporation.  See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 94 F.3d 189, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 58. The sale of assets will transfer the seller’s liabilities to the purchasing entity when the 
transaction amounts to an express or “de facto” merger.  Courts consider the following factors in 
determining whether a “de facto” merger exists: (1) continuity of shareholders, management, 
personnel and location of assets before and after the transaction; (2) prompt dissolution of the 
selling corporation; and (3) the buyer’s assumption of the seller’s ordinary business obligations.  
See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990); Knapp v. North 
Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. 
Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974). 
 59. Courts typically have considered the following factors in applying the “mere 
continuation” exception: (1) only one corporation exists after the transaction; and (2) an identity 
of stock, stockholders, and directors exists between the two corporations.  Mozingo v. Correct 
Mfg., 752 F.2d 168, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1985).  In the past decade, a number of courts have begun to 
deviate from this traditional rule.  Id. at 175.  Courts may begin to apply the “continuity of 
enterprise,” also referred to as the “substantial continuity” theory, in health care cases.  Under the 
“substantial continuity” approach, the court weighs the following factors: (1) retention of same 
employees; (2) retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production 
facilities and location; (4) production of the same products; (5) retention of the same name; (6) 
continuity of assets; (7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether the successor 
holds itself out to be a continuation of the previous enterprise.  United States v. Carolina 
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992). See also Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 175; United 
States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 642-43 (W.D. Ky. 1990).  This test differs from the “mere 
continuation” approach in that it does not require a continuity of shareholders or directors 
between the predecessor and successor corporation. 
 60. Andrew J. Lubrano & Stephen B. Straske II, Mergers, Share Exchanges, and Sale of 
Assets, FLA. B. HANDBOOK 1999, § 10.54, at 58-59 (1999).  Under the fraudulent transaction 
exception, the successor corporation may be held liable for the predecessor’s liabilities if the 
transaction is conducted merely to escape liability. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
122 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:113 
to the common law rule in assessing liability to a successor corporation.61  
Regarding the four general exceptions, the court stated that “the Supreme 
Court and this Circuit have imposed liability upon successors beyond the 
bounds of the common law rule in a number of different . . . contexts to 
vindicate important federal statutory policies.”62  The courts are willing to 
ignore the corporate entity and assess liability to a successor corporation and/or 
individual shareholders63 in situations where it is apparent that an attempt to 
avoid liability has been made, or when liability is expressly assumed.  Judicial 
application of any or all of the above noted theories depend upon case specific 
facts. 
B. Successor Liability under Medicare Statutes 
The case law on Medicare successor liability is limited.  On June 1, 1994, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued the leading 
decision in the context of an overpayment.  In United States v. Vernon Home 
Health, Inc., a corporation that purchased the assets of a home health agency 
was obligated under the Medicare regulations to repay approximately $30,000 
in Medicare overpayments made by the government to the prior owner even 
though it assumed no liabilities in the purchase agreement.64  The Fifth Circuit 
held that a purchase of the assets of a home health provider, including the 
seller’s provider agreement and provider number, subjected the buyer to 
liability for Medicare overpayments made to the seller prior to the sale.65 
The court rejected the buyer’s arguments that under Texas corporate law 
the buyer of assets does not assume liabilities.66  Rather, it held that Medicare 
regulations preempt Texas corporate law regarding successor liability, and 
based its decision on the applicable regulation.67  The Medicare regulation 
 
 61. Upholsterers’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 
1326 (7th Cir. 1990) (imposing liability on a successor corporation for inadequate pension funds 
provided for by its predecessor, illustrating the court’s willingness to apply the concept of 
successor liability when dictated by matters of public policy).  See also Sullivan v. J.S. Sales 
Plumbing, Inc., No. 92 C 7393, 1994 WL 55659, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1994); Central States, 
S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Funds v. Hayes, 789 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 62. Upholsterers’ Int’l, 920 F.2d at 1326.  In product liability cases, successors have been 
found liable for defective products where they have taken over the predecessor’s lines of business 
and the predecessor no longer exists to provide relief.  See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 
116 (1996). 
 63. See, e.g., Beverly Enter. v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding a buyer of 
the stock owned by corporate owners of a nursing home liable for Medicare overpayments to 
corporation). 
 64. United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc., 21 F.3d 693, 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 65. Id. at 696. 
 66. Id. at 695-96. 
 67. Id.  The court reasoned that: 
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governing provider agreements mandates that an assigned agreement be 
subject to all applicable statutes and regulations and to the terms and 
conditions under which it was originally issued.68  The court stated that when 
the assets of the home health provider were purchased, the provider agreement 
was automatically assigned, but noted that the buyer could have rejected the 
automatic assignment and applied for a new provider agreement.69  Thus, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the buyer was liable for the seller’s overpayment 
liability because the buyer did not apply for a new provider agreement.70 
In late 1994, HCFA ratified the result in Vernon in a memorandum from 
the Director of the Office of Survey and Certification (“Tirone 
Memorandum”).71  In addition, HCFA repeatedly proposed a rule that would in 
effect codify Vernon.72  However, the proposed rule has not been adopted.73  
 
The controlling regulation is Title 42 C.F.R. § 489.18(d) which requires: “An assigned 
agreement is subject to all applicable statutes and regulations and to the terms and 
conditions under which it was originally issued . . . .”  Thus, any purchase of assets that 
involves the assignment of the provider agreement is subject to the relevant statutory and 
regulatory conditions.  One of these conditions is that adjustments are made for 
overpayments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  § 1395g(a): “The Secretary shall periodically 
determine . . . necessary adjustments on account of previously made overpayments . . . .” 
See Beverly Enters. v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding buyer of stock 
of corporate owners of nursing home liable for Medicare overpayments to corporation); In 
re Metro. Hosp., 131 B.R. 283, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the Secretary’s right to 
offset overpayments is mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1395(g), which serves as a limitation on 
the assignment in bankruptcy of the provider payments). 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 696. 
 69. Vernon, 21 F.3d at 696. 
 70. Id.  The court stated “[b]y accepting that assignment, Vernon II [the buyer] agreed (albeit 
unknowingly) to accept the terms and conditions of the regulatory scheme.  Thus, it is liable for 
the overpayments.”  Id. 
 71. See OFFICE OF SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION, BUREAU OF HEALTH STANDARDS AND 
QUALITY, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, MEMORANDUM ON COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE REPORT OF COURT RULING 
REGARDING TRANSFER OF PROVIDER AGREEMENT 15-20 (1994) [hereinafter Tirone 
Memorandum]. 
 72. See Nov. 1995 & 1998 Semi-Annual Regulatory Agenda. 
 73. Health care providers who have defrauded and abused the federal health care programs 
may file for bankruptcy to avoid paying fines or returning overpayments.  By declaring 
bankruptcy, providers get (1) an “automatic stay,” blocking creditors from trying to recover 
money owed; and (2) discharged financial debts, including overpayments and fines.  
Unfortunately, previous bankruptcy bills have failed to include any language providing relief to 
federal health care programs.  See Vice President Gore Announces New Efforts to Fight Health 
Care Fraud and Abuse, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4636036; 
Katherine E. Harris, Bankruptcy Bills Fail to Close Loophole That Shields Providers From Fraud 
Liability, 3 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 420 (May 19, 1999).  However, a new bill unveiled 
recently would force bankrupt health care providers to pay fines and overpayments and make it 
easier to exclude these providers from federal health care programs.  See Katherine E. Harris, 
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HCFA initially indicated that a successor to a provider agreement would be 
liable for all Medicare penalties and sanctions owed by the old owner, unless 
otherwise stated in the change of ownership.74  However, HCFA later revised 
this statement, concluding that the successor would be liable for overpayments 
incurred by the previous owner by mere acceptance of the provider agreement, 
regardless of what is stated in the sales agreement.75  To further expound upon 
the implications of accepting assignment of a provider agreement, HCFA 
recently noted that “[i]n accordance with the decision in Vernon, we believe 
that in accordance with the regulations, all liabilities, including overpayments, 
of the old owner should be transferred to the new owner when the new owner 
accepts assignment of the provider agreement.”76 
IV.  SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR OVERPAYMENTS, FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
DAMAGES AND PENALTIES, AND CORPORATE INTEGRITY OBLIGATIONS 
When a buyer acquires another corporation, it may not know if the seller is 
subject to a qui tam suit and a government investigation.77  Regardless of the 
 
New Bill Would Force Bankrupt Providers to Pay Fines, Overpayments, 3 Health Care Fraud 
Rep. (BNA) 577 (June 30, 1999). 
 74. Effect of Change of Ownership on Provider and Supplier Penalties, Sanctions, and 
Overpayments, 59 Fed. Reg. 20,387 (proposed Apr. 25, 1994); Effect of Change of Ownership on 
Provider and Supplier Penalties, Sanctions, and Overpayments, 59 Fed. Reg. 57,596 (proposed 
Nov. 14, 1994). 
 75. See Tirone Memorandum, supra note 71, at 18-19. 
 76. DISABLED AND ELDERLY HEALTH PROGRAMS GROUP, CENTER FOR MEDICAID AND 
STATE OPERATIONS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, MEMORANDUM ON TREATMENT OF UNDERPAYMENTS AND OVERPAYMENTS 
IN CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP SITUATIONS 1 (1999). 
  In an unpublished decision, a federal court recently adopted the reasoning of Vernon.  
See Deerbrook Pavilion v. Shalala, No. 98-4179-CV-SOW-ECT (W.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 1999).  In 
Deerbrook Pavilion, the court held that a buyer would be liable for a civil monetary penalty 
which was originally assessed on the previous owner of a provider agreement.  The court stated: 
Plaintiff was automatically assigned the provider agreement its predecessor held, the same 
agreement under which the predecessor incurred civil monetary penalties.  These penalties 
were assessed pursuant to relevant federal statutes providing for the imposition of ‘a civil 
money penalty . . . for each day of noncompliance’ with certain regulations.  42 U.S.C. § 
1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (penalties under Medicare); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (h)(2)(A)(ii) 
(analogous penalties under Medicaid).  An assigned agreement remains subject to all 
relevant statutes, regulations, terms and conditions under which it was originally issued.  
42 C.F.R. § 489.18(d).  Therefore, adopting the reasoning of Vernon, it follows that 
plaintiff is properly subject to the civil money penalties imposed on it by HCFA. 
Deerbrook Pavilion, No. 98-4179-CV-SOW-ECT, slip. op. at 7.  This court did not address the 
issue of False Claims Act liability. 
 77. Corporations are required to disclose any government investigations to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission when they file their 10Ks.  However, it is possible that many corporations 
will be unaware of any investigation while a qui tam complaint remains under seal.  See supra 
note 31. 
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seller’s status, the buyer’s financial liability will depend largely upon whether 
the transaction was an asset or stock purchase.  The term “asset purchase” has 
become a convenient label in the legal arena because of the significant benefits 
an asset purchase can bring a buyer in a corporate health care transaction.  
Accordingly, courts and the federal government are likely to apply an 
expansive interpretation of the law and look behind the transaction’s actual 
documents to see whether the transaction was in fact a sale of assets or merely 
an attempt to avoid liability. 
A. Overpayments 
Vernon provides valuable guidance to attorneys on how other courts and 
the government will view Medicare successor liability issues.  However, it is 
important to note that Vernon has limited applicability.  First, the case is only 
binding authority in the Fifth Circuit.  In addition, Vernon is limited to its 
specific facts.  Vernon involved a home health agency that was a Medicare Part 
A (“Part A”) provider.78  Under Part A, a participating provider’s rights and 
obligations arise upon execution of a Medicare Provider Agreement.79  In 
contrast, Medicare Part B (“Part B”) “suppliers” do not enter into provider 
agreements with HCFA.80  In fact, reflecting the absence of a contractual 
relationship under Part B, the regulations define “supplier” as “a physician or 
other practitioner, or an entity other than a provider, that furnishes health care 
 
 78. Vernon, 21 F.3d at 694.  The Medicare program is comprised of two separate and 
distinct parts, each of which is funded by a separate trust fund.  Part A is financed by 
contributions from employees, employers, and the self-employed and provides traditional hospital 
insurance by reimbursing in-patient hospital, skilled nursing, hospice, and home health services.  
Part B, a voluntary insurance program for the aged and disabled, provides Supplementary 
Medical Insurance by paying for physician and other medical and health services, as opposed to 
the primarily institutional type of services covered by Part A.  Part B is financed through 
premiums paid by beneficiaries and through federal government appropriations.  See FURROW ET 
AL., supra note 42, § 13-1, at 562. 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  The Medicare regulations define 
“provider” as “a hospital [or other healthcare institution] that has in effect an agreement to 
participate in Medicare.” 42 C.F.R. § 400.202 (1998).  During the life of the agreement, a Part A 
provider furnishes medical care to program beneficiaries.  In return, the provider is reimbursed 
from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund under the Prospective Payment System (“PPS”), 
which conditions government payment to patient discharge.  At the end of its fiscal year, a Part A 
provider must submit a cost report to a Medicare fiscal intermediary to determine whether the 
provider was underpaid or overpaid.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 13-8 to -10. 
 80. Part B participants (either suppliers or beneficiaries) submit claims for payment to, and 
receive reimbursement from, a carrier.  Payments for physician services under Part B are made 
from the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund on the basis of fee schedules. See 
FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 13-21, 22.  Payments for other services, such as outpatient 
services, are based on the Part B program’s traditional reasonable cost reimbursement practice.  
Id. § 13-25. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
126 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:113 
services under Medicare.”81  Since the Fifth Circuit’s analysis focused on the 
contractual arrangement of the Part A provider, Vernon is not applicable to 
transactions involving Part B “suppliers.”82 
The Vernon court established that a buyer is liable for overpayments to a 
seller when the buyer accepts the automatic assignment of the Medicare 
provider agreement.83  Because the court held that applicable federal law 
preempts any state corporate law, Vernon does not discuss the issue of whether 
the transaction constitutes an asset purchase.84  However, the Vernon court 
noted that the key factor in its determination was that the buyer accepted the 
automatic assignment of the seller’s provider agreement rather than incurring a 
break in service and applying for a new provider agreement.85  When Part A 
providers are involved, it is possible that other courts will impose overpayment 
liability when the buyer accepts automatic assignment of the seller’s provider 
agreement, based upon the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Vernon.86 
However, the Fifth Circuit may have reached the same conclusion had 
Vernon involved a Part B supplier.  The court would likely have conducted an 
analysis of the applicable state law regarding successor liability, predicated 
 
 81. 42 C.F.R. § 400.202 (1998). 
 82. Vernon, 21 F.3d at 693. 
 83. Id. at 696. 
 84. Id. at 695. 
 85. Id. at 696.  As a practical matter, the buyer did not want to obtain a new provider 
agreement because it would result in a delay in Medicare certification.  There is often an interim 
period between the date that the new owner begins to provide services to Medicare patients and 
the date on which the new provider is eligible to receive payment for such services.  As a result, 
the purchasing corporation would have forfeited significant Medicare payments for services it 
provided during this interim period.  See Tirone Memorandum, supra note 71, at 15-18. 
 86. The Vernon court held that federal law “preempted” the relevant state law because a 
nationwide federal program was at issue.  Vernon, 21 F.3d at 695-96.  After the Vernon decision, 
there has been a growing body of Supreme Court and federal case law disfavoring the use of 
federal policy concerns to override well established state corporate law principles governing 
successor liability.  See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (concluding 
“[the Court] of course would not contradict an explicit federal statutory provision . . . [or] adopt a 
court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; 
matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition of state 
law.”); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 214 (1997) (noting that “a federal court may fashion 
federal common-law rules only upon a specific showing that the use of state law will create a 
significant conflict with, or threat to, some federal policy or interest.”). 
  Arguably, the regulatory language that “[a]n assigned agreement is subject to all 
applicable statutes and regulations and to the terms and conditions under which it was originally 
issued” upon which the Vernon court based its decision, does not specifically address any issues 
relating to state corporate successor law; accordingly, it is not in conflict with state corporate law.  
Thus, it is possible that future courts could hold that state successor liability law could be the 
applicable standard when the federal authority is vague or silent.  As the following discussion 
notes, however, this would not change the end result.  See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying 
text. 
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upon the fact that state corporate law does not directly conflict with federal law 
regarding assessment of liability against a Medicare Part B supplier.  The Fifth 
Circuit may have considered whether the buyer’s purchase of the seller’s assets 
in Vernon gave rise to a de facto merger.87 
The Fifth Circuit would have conducted a factual analysis to see whether 
the transaction constituted a de facto merger.  For example, to assess whether 
the buyer assumed the seller’s ordinary business obligations, the Fifth Circuit 
may have noted if the buyer applied for new provider numbers for each federal 
health care program to which the buyer submits claims.88  A new entity is 
permitted to use the seller’s Part B provider number, but must notify Medicare 
by filing a change of ownership notice.89  The Fifth Circuit and other courts 
may well have assessed liability to a buyer who accepted a seller’s provider 
number if the courts viewed the buyer’s acceptance as assuming the seller’s 
ordinary business obligations.  Accordingly, future courts could decide that the 
corporate transaction is a de facto merger rather than an asset sale. 
Alternatively, even though a Part B supplier does not execute a formal 
contract with HCFA, provider numbers for Part B suppliers arguably 
correspond to Part A provider agreements.90  Thus, a court may impose 
liability based upon a contractual analysis similar to the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Vernon.  Accordingly, when a supplier purchases the assets of 
another supplier, it should apply for a new provider number to create a 
corporeal barrier between previous business practices and ongoing billing. 
 
 87. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing the factors courts typically look at 
when considering whether a de facto merger exists). 
 88. All health care providers and suppliers are required to submit a provider/supplier 
enrollment application, known as HCFA 855, for enrollment in any federal health care program.  
See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH CARE PROVIDER/SUPPLIER APPLICATION, GENERAL APPLICATION-
HCFA 855 (1/98) (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.wellmedicare.com/forms/hcfa855198.pdf>. 
 89. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH CARE PROVIDER/SUPPLIER APPLICATION, CHANGE OF INFORMATION 
FORM-HCFA 855C (1/98) (visited Jan. 18, 2000) 
<http://www.wellmedicare.com/forms/hcfa855c198.pdf>. 
 90. Compare 42 C.F.R. § 424.55 (1998), with 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc.  In general, this would 
not be an issue for Part B suppliers such as physicians and practitioners because when they sell 
their practices they cannot assign the rights to future billing by the acquiring individual or entity; 
individual provider numbers are nonassignable since they are based on individual qualifications.  
See Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,150, at 4633-5 to 4633-6 (1996).  However, under 
limited circumstances, a physician could assign outstanding receivables to a successor or execute 
a reassignment of benefits.  In addition, Part B group provider numbers may be assigned provided 
the individual physicians who constitute the group do not change.  Members of the group practice 
may change, but Medicare requires notice of these changes and for this reason, successor liability 
issues are similar to the issues discussed for individuals. 
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B. Liability Under the False Claims Act 
HCFA took advantage of the Vernon ruling, and ratified the result in the 
Tirone Memorandum.91  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Vernon was silent on the 
issue of whether the buyer would be liable for Medicare damages and 
penalties.92  Nonetheless, HCFA indicated that a successor to a provider 
agreement would be liable for all Medicare damages and penalties of the 
previous owner.93 
HCFA’s position is not absolute.  The Tirone Memorandum has never 
been promulgated as a proposed or final rule.  Moreover, it is uncertain 
whether a court would uphold HHS’s position on imposing False Claims Act 
liability in a successor liability transaction.  It is easier to recoup an 
overpayment than to impose civil damages and penalties upon a successor 
because liability for an overpayment requires no culpability.94  Conversely, the 
False Claims Act and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law only impose penalties 
on those who “knowingly” participate in the wrongdoing.95 
Even so, the federal government will likely argue that the buyer is 
responsible for the seller’s False Claims Act liability.96  Based upon the above 
analysis regarding overpayment liability, the government could determine that 
the buyer contractually accepted the seller’s False Claims Act liability by 
accepting the seller’s provider agreement.97  While the False Claims Act 
enables the government to receive treble damages and penalties of up to 
$10,000 per false claim to deter fraud and abuse, a court may find it more 
equitable to assess damages above the overpayment amount to recoup the 
interest the government lost on the improperly submitted claims and to deter 
other providers from committing fraudulent acts.98  In addition, the primary 
 
 91. Tirone Memorandum, supra note 71, at 15-18. 
 92. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Tirone Memorandum, supra note 71, at 20. 
 94. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.371(c) (1998). 
 95. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)-(b) (1994).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1994 & Supp. III 
1997) (law regarding Civil Monetary Penalties).  HIPAA clarified the standard of knowledge 
required to impose liability under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law by adding “knowingly” 
before “presents,” see HIPAA § 231(d), 110 Stat. at 2013, and by defining the term “should 
know” to encompass acting with “deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard” of the truth or 
falsity of the claims submitted.  Id.  HIPAA also expressly included “no proof of specific intent to 
defraud is required.”  Id. at 2014.  This language reflects the same standard of knowledge 
required for False Claims Act violations.  Previously, the False Claims Act did not have a 
definition of the “knowledge” requirement until the Act was significantly amended in 1986.  See 
generally S. REP. NO. 99-345. 
 96. See Tirone Memorandum, supra note 71, at 15-18. 
 97. Id. at 15-18. 
 98. The False Claims Act prohibits the knowing filing of a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment to the United States, and the knowing use of a false record or statement to obtain 
payment.  Persons violating these provisions of the statute are subject to civil penalties of not less 
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purpose of the False Claims Act is to enhance the government’s ability to 
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the government.99  When it 
is unclear as to whether the transaction is an asset sale or a de facto merger, the 
court may be compelled to assess liability to the buyer to vindicate important 
federal statutory policies.100 
In a stock sale or merger, courts may even be more willing to assess some 
False Claims Act liability to the buyer.  In a typical stock sale or merger, a 
successor corporation expressly undertakes all the liabilities of its predecessor, 
including any potential claims for Medicare penalties and sanctions.101  The 
rationale behind imposing liability on the buyer in this type of transaction is to 
prevent a corporation from escaping liability because of a mere formality.102  
The buyer likely paid a lower price for the seller’s corporation than had the 
corporation complied with all the applicable federal health care programs’ 
rules and regulations.  Therefore, a court will likely find it equitable to impose 
some liability on the buyer.  However, the amount of liability may depend on 
whether the buyer was fully aware of the seller’s False Claims Act liability. 
C. Corporate Integrity Obligations 
The OIG may take a similar approach in addressing succession issues with 
its Corporate Integrity Agreements (“CIA”).103  In the context of a global 
 
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus treble damages, for each such claim filed.  31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
 99. S. REP. NO. 99-345. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.  The government will have a harder time 
seeking damages from the buyer where the buyer only accepted a provider number.  As discussed 
previously, the court’s assessment in this situation will depend upon whether the court concludes 
that the transaction is in fact an asset purchase.  If a court does not conclude that the transaction is 
an asset purchase, it will impose some liability upon the buyer.  This is especially true where it is 
apparent that an attempt to avoid liability has been made. 
 101. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 102. Id. 
 103. A CIA is an agreement entered into between a health care provider and the government 
in conjunction with a civil settlement related to a fraud and abuse investigation.  It is a 
government-imposed plan, usually entered into as an alternative to other administrative remedies, 
such as exclusion from the federal health care programs. See Criteria for Implementing 
Permissive Exclusion Authority under Section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 67,392, 67,392-93.  CIAs are different from Compliance Programs.  Compliance Programs 
are programs voluntarily designed and implemented by health care providers.  They are not 
government imposed.  There are no absolute requirements as to what elements, structure or 
resources should be incorporated into a voluntarily created compliance plan.  However, if the 
government as part of an investigation examines a compliance plan, proof of its effectiveness by 
the provider may be a key factor in its acceptability as a mitigating factor.  Id. at 67,393-94. See 
generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE FOR HOSPITALS (Feb. 
1998); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL 
LABORATORIES (Aug. 1998); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE FOR 
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settlement to resolve False Claims Act liability, if the OIG is willing to waive 
its permissive exclusion authority and the provider has not agreed to 
voluntarily withdraw from the federal health care program, then the OIG 
customarily will require some contractual assurances of future compliance.104 
The OIG will typically ask the health care provider to implement certain 
corporate integrity obligations under a CIA.105 
In a typical situation, a corporation may have purchased a health care 
company that is subject to a CIA.  Each CIA has a specific provision that states 
it  “shall be binding on the successors, assigns and transferees” of the 
provider.106  In addition, the OIG requires that a provider notify the OIG 
promptly after a company enters into a binding agreement to transfer or sell 
part of its business.107 
Thus, a successor corporation would be required to implement all 
applicable provisions of a CIA.  In this situation, it would be prudent for the 
buyer to carefully consider the CIA’s effect on its operations prior to entering 
 
HOME HEALTH AGENCIES (Aug. 1998).  For materials developed by the OIG as part of its effort 
to identify and curb health care fraud see Department of Health & Human Services, Office of 
Inspector General, Compliance Program Guidance (last modified Nov. 16, 1999)  
<http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/readrm/index.htm> (click on “Compliance Guidance”). 
 104. Id.  The OIG has broad authority to exclude providers from participation in federal 
health care programs.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  For certain offenses, OIG’s 
exclusion authority is mandatory, while for others it is discretionary.  Id.  Permissive exclusions 
may be derivative in form.  For example, permissive exclusions may be based on action 
previously taken by a court, state licensing board, or other federal or state agency.  In those cases 
the OIG is not required to reestablish the factual or legal basis for the underlying sanction.  
Permissive exclusions may also be non-derivative.  For example, the OIG may be required to 
make a prima facie showing that improper conduct occurred.  Id.  The regulations governing 
exclusions are found at 42 C.F.R. Pt. 1001 (1998). 
 105. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Corporate 
Integrity Agreements (CIA’s) (last modified Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/ 
readrm/index.htm> (click on “Corporate Integrity Agreements”). Settlement agreements with 
CIA obligations were first imposed in 1994.  Early CIAs had fewer stringent measures that only 
required providers to develop policies and procedures, attend training, and provide a certification 
to the OIG.  Over the last few years, CIAs have become much more comprehensive.  While each 
CIA is tailored to the specific provider and deals with the specific facts of the conduct at issue, 
most CIAs typically are in effect for five years and require a provider to implement the following 
provisions: (1) hire a compliance officer/establish a compliance committee; (2) develop written 
standards and policies including a code of conduct; (3) implement a comprehensive training 
program; (4) audit billings to the federal health care programs; (5) establish a confidential 
disclosure program; (6) restrict employment of ineligible persons; and (7) submit a variety of 
reports to OIG.  Id. 
 106. A copy of a Corporate Integrity Agreement can be obtained by submitting a Freedom of 
Information Act request to: HHS Freedom of Information Officer, Office of the Inspector 
General, Room 645-F, Hubert Humphrey Building, Department of Health and Human Services, 
200 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20201. 
 107. See id. 
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into the transaction.  Each CIA is tailored to the specific provider and deals 
with the specific facts of the conduct at issue.  Accordingly, the company may 
decide to keep the seller’s company as a wholly owned subsidiary.  Under this 
structuring, the OIG would not likely impose the CIA obligations to the 
buyer’s entire corporation, but only to its new subsidiary. 
In an asset sale, a health care corporation might argue that the CIA liability 
does not transfer to the buyer.  However, the corporation must seriously weigh 
the benefits of continued compliance with the seller’s CIA obligations, even in 
an asset purchase.  The OIG’s analysis to impose liability on the successor 
corporation will likely be similar to a court’s assessment.  The OIG might 
conclude that that the asset purchase agreement is a guise to shield liability and 
is, in fact, a stock purchase or merger.  The OIG could subsequently find that 
the buyer failed to comply with the seller’s compliance obligations and 
materially breached the CIA.  A buyer who materially breaches the CIA is 
subject to exclusion108 -- a death sentence to any corporation doing business 
with federal health care programs.109  It may therefore be prudent for a buyer 
contemplating a transaction to agree to continued compliance with a less 
burdensome CIA than risk being excluded from the federal health care 
programs.  The OIG may only require the buyer in this situation to assume 
corporate integrity obligations until the seller’s facilities are no longer 
operational. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the government continues its efforts to curtail health care fraud and 
abuse, and more companies continue to consolidate, more health care attorneys 
will be confronted with assessing their clients’ Medicare successor liability 
issues.  In light of Vernon and the various HCFA publications, careful 
consideration should be given when a health care provider accepts an 
assignment of a Medicare provider agreement or number in an asset sale.  The 
health care corporation should seriously weigh the benefits of assuming the 
prior owner’s Medicare provider agreement or number or accepting a delay in 
receiving a new provider agreement or number.  Likewise, in the event of a 
stock sale or merger, the buyer or the surviving corporation should carefully 
weigh the benefits of the transaction against the potential liabilities.  It is the 
 
 108. Id.  The parties to a CIA agree that a material breach of the CIA constitutes an 
independent basis for the provider’s exclusion from participation in the federal health care 
programs.  Id. 
 109. Private payors are known to review the OIG’s “List of Excluded Individuals/Entities” 
when deciding whether to retain, contract with, or renew a contract with a health care provider.  
See List of Excluded Individuals/Entities (last modified Jan. 7, 2000) 
<http://www.dhhs.gov/oig/cumsan/1999/index.htm>. 
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attorney’s job to advise clients on the ramifications resulting from a failure to 
structure a true “asset sale.” 
If, however, the client decides to structure the transaction as an “asset 
sale,” there are other steps health care corporations can take to minimize their 
liability.  The buyer can insist that the contract includes a provision 
indemnifying the buyer from pending and/or existing Medicare overpayments, 
fines, and penalties for the time period preceding the execution of the 
transaction.  Further, prior to an asset purchase, it is prudent for the buyer and 
the appropriate federal officials to agree on the total amount of Medicare 
liability involved in the transaction.  Having a firm figure in hand allows the 
buyer to calculate the capital needed to discharge the debt owed to the federal 
health care programs; thus, the buyer is in a better position to negotiate an 
appropriate purchase price for the corporation.  If possible, the buyer should 
try to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the seller’s counsel.  Finally, and 
most importantly, the buyer should effectively communicate with the 
government to clarify any questions surrounding the transaction.  A brief 
phone call or simple letter to the government may reveal an unanticipated 
problem. 
The applicable law on Medicare successor liability issues is relatively 
straightforward.  Courts assess liability to the buyer when they believe the 
transaction is not an asset purchase but rather an artifice to avoid liability.  The 
difficulty lies in the correct judicial application of law to the facts in 
determining whether the transaction is actually an asset sale, or instead, a de 
facto merger. 
 
